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I. PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL-APPLICATION BY FEDERAL COURT

One of the questions presented to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
in the case of Pitts v. McGraw Edison Co.,' was whether the doctrine
of promissory estoppel should be recognized and applied by the
federal court as the law of Tennessee.
Plaintiff was for many years a manufacturer's representative for
defendant. During this time, plaintiff was free to represent other
manufacturers, his status being that of an independent contractor,
and the agreement was terminable without notice at the will of either
party. In 1955, the defendant informed the plaintiff by letter that
he was to be retired as defendant's sales representative. In this letter
defendant informed the plaintiff that he would pay him a one per cent
override commission on sales in the area by the new representative,
to wit, "you will get your check each month just as you have been
in the habit of getting your check -on -ommissions." 2 , -Plaintiff was
not required to perform any services for the payments. The defendant
merely requested, in the nature of a favor solicitation, that the plaintiff
aid defendant's new sales representative in whatever manner he could.
After payment of the monthly commission for five years, the defendant ceased payments, and following an unsuccessful protest, the
plaintiff brought suit.
Plaintiff's first theory was that of ordinary contract, viz, that the
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; Acting Dean, 1964-1965. The author
wishes to express his thanks to Mr. J. P. Jones, a student in the School of Law, for
his invaluable assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. 329 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1964).
2. Id. at 414.
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defendant's letter informing him of the monthly payments and asking
him'to help the new representative was an offer, which was accepted
by his giving assistance to the new representative. The district court
disposed of this theory by noting that there was nothing which the
plaintiff was required to do; hence, there was no valid consideration
to support a contract. The appellate court agreed. It might be pointed
out in passing, however, that a binding unilateral contract never
requires the promisee (plaintiff here) to obligate himself by a return
promise to do anything. Nevertheless, the promisor is contractually
bound.
Plaintiff's alternative theory was based on the doctrine of promissory
estoppel. Using the Restatement definition of promissory estoppel, 3
the court pointed out that the doctrine has had limited application
in the United States, 4 and further noted that it was aware of no
cases in which the principle had been recognized or applied in
Tennessee. 5.

•Under the facts of this case, the court did not find the requisite
elements of estoppel necessary to enforce defendant's promise. The
opinion further noted that although there were possibly other factors
which would prevent the case from coming within the scope of Restatement section 90, the important fact was that plaintiff had not
altered his position in reliance on defendant's promise of monthly
payments. The court noted that the plaintiff did not give up anything
to which he was legally entitled, and that he in no way restricted his
activities in exchange for the payments. The conclusion was that the
injustice required under Restatement section 90 to enforce the promise
was not present.
Had there been substantial forbearance by the plaintiff in this case,
the promissory estoppel doctrine might have been applicable. For
example, if the plaintiff had given up other offers of employment
on the strength of defendant's promise of the commission payments,6
or, if it were a situation where the plaintiff had remained in defendant's employ in reliance upon future payments, 7 the facts might well
have brought the case within section 90 of the Restatement. Even
3. BESTTEMWn , CONTmAcTs § 90 (1932), provides: "Apromise which the promisor
should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial
character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance
is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." For a
discussion of promissory estoppel generally, see 1A Coann, CoNTRAcrs §§ 194, 200,
204 (1950); 1 WrLLIsTON, CONTAcrs § 140 (3d ed. 1957).
4. AXnot., 48 A.L.R.2d 1069, 1081, 1085 (1956).
5. Barnes v. Boyd, 18 Ten. App. 55, 72 S.W.2d 573 (1934). For an earlier discussion of Tennessee's non-recognition of the promissory estoppel doctrine, see 23 TENN.
L. BEv. 423 (1954).
6. Hunter v. Sparling, 87 Cal. App. 2d 711, 197 P.2d 807 (1948).
7. West v. Hunt Foods Inc., 101 Cal. App. 2d 597, 225 P.2d 978 (1951).
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if such additional facts had been present, however, the question
remains whether the court would have been justified in applying the
promissory estoppel doctrine in this case. The court admitted that it
knew of no Tennessee authority for application of the doctrine. Yet,
the opinion intimates that had the requisite elements of Restatement
section 90 been present, the defendant's promise would have been
enforced. It seems, however, that the court should have determined,
if it could, whether Tennessee applies promissory estoppel, since it
is the duty of the federal court to apply the existing state substantive
law.
II. THmD PARTY BENEFICaARY-ENFORCEMENT
AND MATERIAL

OF LABOR

BoND

National Surety Corp. v. Fischer Steel Corp.,8 raised the question

of whether a third party beneficiary to a labor and material bond
could enforce provisions of the bond which were broader than the
statutory requirements.
Plaintiff was an unpaid materialman who had supplied materials
to a contractor, the principal on the bond. The bond required written
notice of claim within ninety days only if the claimant did not have
direct contact with the principal; further, it provided that an action
could be brought within one year after the principal ceased work
under the contract. Finally, the bond provided that "if any limitation
embodied in this bond is prohibited by any law controlling the
construction hereof such limitation shall be deemed to be amended
so as to be equal to the minimum period of limitation permitted by
such law."9
Under the Tennessee statutes, notice within ninety days is required
of a materialman claiming under such a surety bond,10 and the action
must be brought within six months following completion of the
work."
Plaintiff gave no notice and his action was not brought within six
months as required by statute, although the action was commenced
within one year following the work's completion. Defendant maintained that the plaintiff was subject to the statutory provisions and
was given no independent rights under the bond. The court, however,
did think that plaintiff derived independent rights from the bond
in that, under its terms, no notice was required of those of plaintiff's
status and there was a stipulation of a one year period during which
8. 374 S.W.2d 372 (Tenn. 1964).
9. Id. at 374.
10. TEN. CoDE ANN. § 12-421 (1955).
11. TENN. CODE ANN. § 12-422 (1955).
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action could be brought. The court reasoned that the bond did not
refer specifically to the statutes nor did it make the statutory provisions
a part of the bond's conditions.
Third party beneficiary contracts are recognized and enforced in
Tennessee. 2 This position is in accord with the Restatement of
Security13 as well as the almost universal view.14 Moreover, provisions
in a bond which go beyond the statutory requirements constitute a
valid common law undertaking of the surety, 5 and "a bond . . . is
good at common law if entered into voluntarily and for valid consideration, and if it is not repugnant to law16or the policy of the law,
the surety is bound according to its terms."
The bond sued upon, then, expressly gave rights beyond minimum
statutory requirements and,
Where a statute requires that the contractor for a public improvement shall

'give a bond conditioned for the payment of labor and materials, the bond
may be conditioned more broadly than the statute requires, and if a bond
so conditioned is voluntarily given in consideration of the contract, its
extra-statutory provisions may be enforced as a common lav obligation.'

7
The statute merely states minimum requirements.'
Cases on which defendant relied as being contrary were readily
distinguished in that by the terms of the bonds involved, the bonds
were limited to the language of the statutes. 18
Defendant also contended that the language of this bond limited
its terms to the minimum statutory requirements.' 9 The court concluded, however, that this provision referred to a situation where the
contractual period was less than the minimum required by statute and,
since the bond expressly privided for the one year limitation, such

limitation was to be changed only if prohibited by law. Since no
law prohibited the longer period, the terms of the bond created a

common law obligation enforceable against the defendant.
Since statutory provisions for public bonds are a minimum standard
required for the public good, there is no reason why the parties
12. Associated Indem. Corp. v. McAlexander, 168 Tenn. 424, 79 S.W.2d 556 (1935);
Peoples Bank v. Baxter, 201 Tenn. 283, 298 S.W.2d 732 (1956).
13. RESTATEMENT, SEcvmTy § 165 (1941).
14. 2 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 3, § 372.

15. Standard Oil Co. v. Jamison Bros., 166 Tenn. 53, 59 S.W.2d 522 (1933).
16. Day v. Walton, 199 Tenn. 10, 22, 281 S.W.2d 685, 691 (1955).
17. Hogan v. Walsh & Wells, Inc., 180 Tenn. 670, 671, 177 S.W.2d 835, 836 (1944).

See also Clatsop Cy. ex rel. Hildebrand v. Feldschau, 101 Ore. 369, 199 Pac. 953
(1921). See discussion in 43 Aif. JuR. Public Works and Contracts § 146 (1942).
18. City of Knoxville v. Burgess, 180 Tenn. 412, 175 S.W.2d 548 (1943); Cass v.
Smith, 146 Tenn. 218, 240 S.W. 778 (1922); City of Bristol v. Bostwick, 139 Tenn.
304, 202 S.W. 61 (1918).
19. See text accompanying note 9 supra.

1965]

CONTRACTS

1119

contracting among themselves should not be able to extend these
minimum requirements. The court's decision seems based on sound
precedent.
III. STATUTE OF FRAUDS-STATUTE AS DEFENSE TO Trmp PARTY

Love & Amos Coal Co. v. UMW20 contains interesting dictum on
the question of whether a person being sued for inducing breach
of an oral contract unenforceable under the statute of frauds may
rely on the statute as a defense.
Love & Amos, a coal broker, entered into an oral contract with
Osborne Mining Company whereby Osborne agreed to supply coal
to Love & Amos for a period of two years. Osborne did not employ
union help. Through- harassment, violence, and threats, the United
Mine Workers caused Osborne to shut down its plant, rendering it
unable to perform its contract with the plaintiff. In an action by
Love & Amos against United Mine Workers for inducing breach of
contract, the Davidson County Circuit Court awarded actual as
well as treble damages under Tennessee's Treble Damage Statute.21
The defendant, relying on Evans v. Mayberry12 and Watts v.
Warner,23 claimed that since the contract between plaintiff and
Osborne was unenforceable under the statute of frauds, it could not
be held liable for inducing the breach of that contract. The court
rejected defendant's argument, and distinguished these cases by noting
that in both of them the breaching party had repudiated the contract;
whereas, in the instant case, the parties to the contract had reaffirmed
the agreement and had continued their efforts to comply with it.
The court quoted from the Watts case, noting that the rule had been
reiterated in the Evans case:
No judgment could be based against a defendant for interference with an
unenforceable repudiated contract. Certainly after repudiation there were

no legal rights under such a contract which could be infringed.

The court thought that the rule stated in those opinions24 should not
be extended beyond their facts.
It should be noted that in the case at hand the defendant did not
specially plead the statute of frauds as required under Tennessee law.25
20. 378 S.W.2d 430 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1964).

21.

TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1706 (Supp. 1964).

22. 198 Tenn. 187, 278 S.W.2d 691 (1955).
23. 151 Tenn. 421, 269 S.W. 913 (1925).
24. Id. at 422, 269 S.W. at 914.
25. TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-201 (1955). That the statute of frauds normally must
be specially pleaded, see 2 CoRB N, op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 317-20. See also 49 AM.
Jun. Statute of Frauds §§ 601, 602 (1943).
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Further, in the instant case, the court indicated that even had the
statute been specially pleaded, the memorandum requirement of the
statute of frauds was satisfied by way of a collateral writing in which
the contract
between plaintiff and Osborne was specifically men26
tioned.

The majority view is that the statute of frauds is available as a
defense only to parties to the contract and those in privity with them.27
Tennessee, however, has adhered to the minority view that the
statute may be used defensively by third parties.2 An interesting
aspect of the instant case is in the court's language that the rule of
the Watts and Evans cases should be restricted to their facts; thus,
it appears that the opinion may reflect a possible retreat from the
minority view. The court seems to say that even if the writing
requirement had not been satisfied and the statute had been specially
pleaded, the decision in this case would have been the same. In
distinguishing the instant case from Watts and Evans, it was emphasized that in these two decisions, the contracts had been repudiated,
and there were, therefore, no legal rights to be infringed. This distinction is perhaps but a convenient way for the court to begin its
retreat from Tennessee's previous minority position. At least in a
suit for inducing breach where the party had been induced to repudiate the contract by the defendant, rather than to fail in performance,
the court's reasoning would seem to be a distinction without a difference, unless the contract had been repudiated absent any inducement
by the defendant.
The purpose of the statute of frauds is not to render recognized
contracts unenforceable but to prevent fraud.29 The statute should not,
therefore, be available to enable a wrongdoer to escape liability for
his wrongful conduct through a mere technicality.

IV.

PARoL Evm NCE RULE-APPLICATION TO
ExTRaNsic SUBSEQUENT AGREEMENT

Trice v. Hewgley 3 applied the rule that the establishment by
parol evidence of an agreement made subsequent to the writing is
26. 378 S.W.2d at 430, 438, 439.
27. 2 ConBiN op. cit supra note 3, § 289; 2 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcrs § 530 (rev. ed.
1936). See Annot., 26 A.L.R.2d 1227 (1952); Annot., 84 A.L.R. 43 (1933). See also
RESTATRmENT, CoNTRACrs § 218 (1932). Note that illustration 1 of this section is
particularly applicable to the instant case.
28. Elsewhere the writer has had occasion to criticize the minority position taken
by Tennessee. See Hartman, Contracts-1955 Tennessee Survey, 9 VAND. L. REv.
951,.958 (1956).
"99,2 Corbin, op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 317-20.
30. 381 S.W.2d 580" (Tenn' App. M.S. 1964).
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not prohibited by the parol evidence rule.31
Plaintiff, as executrix of deceased's estate, sued defendant on several
promissory notes owed by defendant to the deceased. By way of
defense, defendant alleged that a certain amount of the indebtedness
had been forgiven. The basis of the defense was an oral agreement
in which defendant had agreed to convey to the deceased certain mill
property, in return for which the deceased was to have conveyed a
parcel of land and to have forgiven the amount of the indebtedness
in question. Plaintiff maintained that the parol evidence rule prevented the defendant from proving the agreement and; hence, the
amount of the debt which was forgiven.
The court sustained defendant's position, and in stating the majority
and Tennessee rule, 2 quoted from Brunson v. Gladish, that the parol
evidence rule:
does not prohibit the establishment by parol evidence of an agreement made
subsequent to the execution of the writing, although such subsequent agree-

ment may have the effect of adding to, changing, modifying or even altogether abrogating the contract of the parties as evidenced by the writing;

for the parol evidence rule does not in any way deny that the original
agreement of the parties was that which the writing purports to express,
but merely goes to show that the parties have exercised their right to
33

change or abrogate the same, or to make a new and independent contract.

This clearly is a correct interpretation of the parol evidence rule
which applies only to extrinsic agreements made prior to or contemporary with the written agreement in question. No further citation of
authority is needed to support this proposition of law.
V. ILLEGAL BARGAIwS-AGREEmNT NOT TO COMPE'E

Federated Mutual Implement & Hardware Insurance Co. v. Johnson held as reasonable an employment contract in which the defendant employee had agreed not to compete with the plaintiff employer in a territory, consisting of several counties, for a period of
two years after defendant's termination of employment.
The defendant violated this agreement and the plaintiff brought
action for an injunction and for damages. The chancellor dissolved
the temporary injunction which he had issued, dismissed the case
31. For the rule, see generally BESTATEmENT, ConTRAcTs §§ 237-44 (1932); 4
Wrr.usToN, op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 631, 632.
32. The general rule is stated in WILmsToN, op. cit. supra note 3, § 632. For application of the rule in Tennessee, see Goodwin v. Goodwin, 36 Tenn. App. 630, 260 S.W.2d
186 (M.S. 1953); Perry v. Central R. Co., 45 Tenn. 138 (1867).
33. Brunson v. Gladish, 174 Tenn. 309, 316, 125 S.W.2d 144, 147 (1939).
34. 382 S.W.2d 214 (.Tenn. App. W.S. 1964).
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and plaintiff appealed. The court of appeals sustained the plaintiff.

The case is practically on all fours with Federated Mutual Implement & Hardware Insurance Co. v. Anderson,5 which involved a
contract almost identical to the agreement in the instant case. The
only difference was that in Anderson there was no stipulation for
liquidated damages and the territory comprised a larger area. Yet, the
Court of Appeals for the Eastern Section had reversed a dismissal of
the bill by the chancellor. 36 The chancellor in the instant case, however did not think the Anderson case controlling on the facts. In disagreeing with the chancellor the Johnson court quoted the Anderson
case as follows:
Contracts to protect an employer by restriction of subsequent employment of
the employee within reasonable lengths of time and space are permitted and
in violation
sanctioned and equity will enjoin an employee from competing
37
of the restrictive provisions of his employment contract.

The reasons for upholding such a contract was explained in the case
of Arkansas Dailies v. Dan:
A business is built upon the confidence of its customers and the employee
gains acquaintances and sells the customers by using the good will of the
employer. The employer's dealings with the customer through the employee
gives the employee confidential knowledge that should not be divulged or
used for his own benefit .... 38

Restrictive contracts, such as the one involved in the instant case
are upheld when they are reasonable as to time and space.39 The

facts of the case before the court fall clearly within the Restatement
provision as an instance of a reasonable restraint:
A bargain by an assistant, servant, or agent not to compete with his
employer, or principal, during the term of the employment or agency, or
thereafter within such territory and during such time as may be reasonably
necessary for the protection of the employer or principal, without imposing
4°
undue hardship on the employee or agent.
41
This provision is well recognized in Tennessee.

35. 49 Tenn. App. 124, 351 S.W.2d 411 (E.S. 1961).
36. Ibid.
37. Id. at 133, 351 S.W.2d at 415.
38. 36 Tenn. App. 663, 673, 260 S.W.2d 200, 204 (W.D. 1953).
39. On two earlier occasions the writer has had occasion to discuss the validity of
agreements in restraint of trade in Tennessee. See Hartman, Contracts-1961 Tennessee
Survey, 14 VAND. L. REv. 1196, 1212 (1961); Hartman, Contracts-1957 Tennessee
Survey, 10 VAND. L. REv. 1013, 1033 (1957). For instances where restrictive contracts
have been held unenforceable, see Annot., 3 A.L.R.2d 519 (1943). See also 36 A.
Jun. Monopolies §§ 50, 54 (1941).
40. RESTATEMENT, CoNTRAcTs § 516 (1932).
41. Matthews v. Barnes, 155 Tenn. 110, 293 S.W. 993 (1927); Turner v. Abbott,
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VI. DEATH OF PARTY TO PERSONAL SERVICE CONTRACr AS
TERMINATING THE CONTRACT

Rodgers v. Southern Newspapers Inc.4 raised the question of when
the death of one of the parties to a personal service contract will
terminate the agreement.
Plaintiff's husband sold a newspaper to defendants in 1946. At
that time, he entered into a contract with defendants whereby he was
to receive monthly payments for twelve years in return for his services
as director and consultant of the newspaper. After his marriage to
plaintiff in 1955, Mr. Rodgers, plaintiff, and defendant entered into a
separate contract. This agreement provided that upon expiration of
the twelve year contract, or upon its termination, there would be a
continuation of the original agreement for a period of ten years, with
a provision for monthly payments to Mr. Rodgers for his services. In
addition, the agreement provided the following:
Should party of the first part die before the ending of the term of payments provided for in this contract then the remaining payments shall be
made to his wife, Della Richard Rodgers, and in such event she shall substitute 43in the service agreed to herein and be paid for such remaining
period.

Plaintiff's husband died in 1957, with about a year left to run on
the original agreement. Defendant refused to allow Mrs. Rodgers to
substitute her performance under the contract on the theory that the
agreement terminated by Mr. Rodgers' death. Plaintiff's suit in
chancery court was dismissed and she appealed.
The court recognized the well established general rule that in a
personal service contract, death of one of the contracting parties generally terminates the agreement.4 There are exceptions to the general
rule, however, e.g., when the service is of such character that it can be
performed by another or when the contract's terms show that performance by others was contemplated. 45 The court noted that it had
previously recognized such exceptions, 46 and also took cognizance of
the Restatement view that a party is not discharged by death if the
116 Tenn. 718, 94 S.W. 64 (1906); Arkansas Dailies v. Dan, 36 Tenn. App. 663,
260 S.W.2d 200 (W.D. 1953).

42. 379 S.W.2d 797 (Tenn. 1964).
43. Id. at 798.
44. 6 WILUSTON, op. cit. supra note 27, § 1940. For a discussion of the general rule

see 17 AM. Jur. 2d Contracts § 413 (1964).
45. Ibid. See also RESTATEMENT, CoNTaAcTs § 459 (1932).
46. Greenwood v. National Biscuit Co., 175 Tenn. 302, 134 S.W.2d 149 (1939).

For other cases recognizing the exception, see Howard v. Adams, 16 Cal. 2d 253, 105
P.2d 971 (1940); Stein v. Bruce, 366 S.W.2d 732 (Mo. App. 1963); McCarty v.
Sturm, 289 P.2d 145 (Okla. 1954).
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contract indicates a contrary intention. 47 The court thought it clear
that under the terms of the contract the parties had contemplated
substitution of plaintiff's services in the event of Mr. Rodger's death
and, hence, the contract was distinctly within one of the exceptions
to the general rule.
The defendant also contended that the ten year contract had not
yet begun at the time of Mr. Rodgers' death but the court ruled that
there was an executory contract created at the time of the agreement
between plaintiff, defendant, and Mr. Rodgers, even though performance was to begin at a future date.
The court's decision seems merely to reflect an application of the
well settled rule that a personal service contract need not be terminated by death of one of the parties if performance by another is
contemplated and if the parties contract for such substituted performance. The contract here clearly indicates that the parties anticipated
the death of Mr. Rodgers and made provision therefor. Moreover,
plaintiff was a party to the contract here and had assented to its
terms. Since plaintiff had bound herself to the contract's terms it
seems clear that defendant could have maintained an action against
plaintiff if she had refused to perform after her husband's death.
47.

RFSTAT M

T, CoNTRAS

§ 459 (1932).

